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This paper examines the incentives of ideological media outlets to acquire
costly information in a context of asymmetric information between political
parties and voters. We consider two market structures: a monopoly media
market and a duopoly one. We show that if each party has the support
of a medium, either party has the same probability of winning the election.
However, if just one of the parties has the support of the media, the results
might well change, as this party will get into o￿ce with a higher probability
than the other party. We also analyze voters’ welfare in this context and
show that the important aspect is whether a media industry exists, and not
the number of media outlets.
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1 Introduction
The public concern with the control of politicians is a recurrent topic within the
literature on political economy. It was ￿rst studied by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn
(1986), who analyzed how to induce o￿ce-holders to choose the policies preferred
by the electorate rather than those preferred by themselves. They set up their
models in dynamic contexts, and showed that the presence of regular elections act
as a monitoring device of politicians’ behavior.
More recently, a number of empirical and theoretical papers that consider the
media as watchdogs have appeared. Among them, Besley and Burgess (2002)
present evidence, for Indian states, of a strong correlation between the level of
circulation of newspapers and the responsiveness of governments. Adser￿ et al.
(2003) show that an increasingly informed electorate makes for more government
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1e￿ectiveness and for fewer corrupt practices. Djankov et al. (2003) prove that gov-
ernment ownership of media undermines political and economical freedom. On
the theoretical side, Besley and Prat (2006) and Vaidya (2005) show that collu-
sion between the government and the media can undermine corruption deterrence
and Chan and Suen (2006) prove that media induce politicians to choose policies
that better match the preference of the median voter.
This paper explores the interaction between media outlets with a political mo-
tive and election campaigns. Our aim is to study whether ideological media out-
lets can be a control of politicians’ behavior and whether the existence of such
media may bias the political game. To make our point, we consider the model
in Andina-D￿az (2007) as our baseline. In Andina-D￿az (2007), we investigate the
incentives of neutral media outlets to control politicians in a context of asymmet-
ric information between political parties and voters. We also investigate how an
increase in competition in the media market a￿ects such incentives. The main
result of this paper is that the readers’ purchasing habits is a key variable that
determines whether media competition favors information disclosure or not. We
also show that if the number of newspapers is large, the candidates’ incentives to
reveal their information do not depend on the readers’ purchasing habits.
An important assumption we make in Andina-D￿az (2007) is that media out-
lets are neutral, i.e., they do not have a political preference. This is a reasonable
assumption in some countries (a classical example is television in the UK, where
the Independent Television Commission, ITC, regulates political news, calling for
impartiality and plurality),1 but does not ￿t the reality of many others (especially
in emerging and transitional economies).2 This paper presents an extension of
Andina-D￿az (2007), to consider the case of ideological media outlets that aim to
contribute to the election of their preferred politician. We simplify and reformu-
late the model in Andina-D￿az (2007) to incorporate media outlets that no longer
care about audience but merely about political rents. We consider two market
structures: a monopoly media market and a duopoly one. For each of the market
structures, we study the incentives of ideological media outlets to acquire costly
information (assuming they cannot manipulate news) and the political equilibria
that exist in each case. We obtain that all the (pure strategies) equilibria are
pooling equilibria, i.e., the existence of a market for news does not result in full
information disclosure in the political game. Further, our results show that the
quality of the political game may be undermined if the media do not support all
the parties equally. In particular, we prove that if each party has the support of
one medium, either party has the same probability of winning the election. How-
ever, if just one of the parties has the support of the media, the results might well
change, as this party will get into o￿ce with a higher probability than the other
1￿The Broadcasting Act 1990 makes it the statutory duty of the ITC to draw up, and from time
to time, review a code giving guidance as to the rules to be observed for the purpose of preserving
due impartiality on the part of licensees as respects matters of political or industrial controversy
or relating to current public policy ￿. The ITC Programme Code.
2See Djankov et al. (2003).
2party. We also analyze voters’ welfare in this context and observe that it is higher
under a market for news than under no such industry, and that, in equilibrium,
having one or two media outlets does not matter for voters.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In
Section 3 we derive the equilibria and analyze the political and welfare implications.
Finally, we conclude in Section 4.
2 The model
We consider two political parties that compete for o￿ce. Each party is represented
by a candidate. The candidates in a party may di￿er in their extremism so as to
their preferred policy. Nature selects a candidate in each party that proposes a
non-binding platform and runs for o￿ce. Ideological media outlets observe the
candidates’ platforms and decide whether to investigate their non-preferred candi-
date or not. Voters observe the candidates’ platforms and the media’s messages,
update beliefs on the candidates types and decide for whom to vote.
Political parties. Let L be the left-wing party and R be the right-wing one.
Each party is represented by a candidate. A priori, candidates in each party can
be either moderate, M; or extreme, with L for the left and R for the right-wing
party. Thus, the set of possible types is TL = fL;Mg; TR = fR;Mg with tL 2 TL;
tR 2 TR. Nature moves ￿rst and chooses the type of the two candidates (one for
each party). A candidate’s type is his own private information, although voters
have priors on it. The prior probability that a candidate is extreme is q, with
q 2 (0;1).
The two candidates propose non-binding platforms and run for o￿ce.3 The
space of platforms is PL = fl;mg; PR = fr;mg for candidates in party L and
R respectively, with pL 2 PL; pR 2 PR: A (pure) strategy for a candidate from
party L is a function ¨L : TL ! fl;mg; and that of a candidate from party R is
¨R : TR ! fr;mg. Candidates’ goal is to win the election.
Media outlets. We consider an ideological media market, i.e., media outlets
that obtain political bene￿ts if their preferred party gets into o￿ce. Let ¤ > 0
be the political bene￿t. We assume that media competition is solely for political
bene￿ts, i.e., outlets do not care about audience but merely about ¤:
We consider two market structures: a monopoly media market and a duopoly
one. Let L be the media outlet preferring the left-wing party and R be the one
preferring the right-wing party. Media outlets observe politicians’ platforms, up-
date beliefs on the candidates’ types and decide (simultaneously in the case of two
outlets) whether to investigate their non-preferred candidate or not.4 A (pure)
strategy for outlet i 2 fL;Rg is a function ªi : PL £ PR ! fI;NIg. We assume
that when a media outlet does not investigate, it gets no information on the can-
3In a one-shot game, it implies that the elected politician will implement his type as the policy.
4The media outlets could also choose to investigate their preferred candidate, but this would
rarely occur in equilibrium, so we disregard this case.
3didate’ true type and so, it reports in the paper what the two candidates have told
in their campaigns. In contrast, when a media outlet investigates, we assume that
it observes the true type of its non-preferred candidate (the one it investigates)
and reports this information in the paper (as well as the campaign platform for its
preferred candidate).5 We denote by Mi = flr;lm;mr;mmg the space of messages
(reports) of outlet i; 8i 2 fL;Rg; and by mi 2 Mi an element of this set, where the
￿rst (second) component of mi refers to the left-wing (right-wing) party. Finally,
to investigate implies a strictly positive ￿xed cost, K > 0:
Voters. We consider a ￿nite and odd number n of (moderate) voters. Voters
maximize their expected utility, which is de￿ned on the policy implemented by the
elected candidate (his type). Voters’ preferences are M Â L » R:6
Voters observe candidates’ platforms and media’s messages, update beliefs on





i=L;R Mi ! fL;Rg that maps all pair of candidates’
platforms and media’s messages into the choice of whom to vote for. Citizen v
votes for L (R) if she believes L (R) to be more likely a moderate type than R (L).
In case of indi￿erence, a coin ￿ip determines her vote.
3 Equilibrium analysis
The notion of equilibrium we use is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, which, for
this game, is a vector of strategies for candidates, media outlets and voters, and a
vector of beliefs for media and voters, such that:
(i) Candidates maximize their number of votes, media outlets maximize their
political payo￿s and voters maximize their expected utility.
(ii) The belief of media outlets on candidate j 2 fL;Rg is derived from Bayes’
Rule, i.e., 8pj 2 Pj;
¹¤





j(t0)(pj)P(t0) 8t 2 Tj; whenever possible.
(iii) The belief of voters on candidate j 2 fL;Rg is derived from Bayes’ Rule,













j(t0)(pj)P(t0) 8t 2 Tj;






is the probability that medium
i; where i 2 fL;Rg; sends message m
j
i about (its non-preferred) candidate j; where
j 2 fL;Rg; j 6= i; when candidate j has proposed platform pj; being t 2 Tj his
type.
5Note that if we allow media outlets to manipulate news (to hide information) and we consider
that this is common knowledge, in equilibrium, voters will not take into account media news and
mass media will make no di￿erence
6Alternatively, we can consider that there are three types of voters: leftists (l), rightists (r)
and moderates (m); with preferences L Âl M Âl R, R Âr M Âr L and M Âm L »m R. In this
case, our results hold whenever partisan voters are captive and the median voter is moderate.
4Regarding the beliefs o￿ the equilibrium path, we assume that: (i) Whenever
candidate j 2 fL;Rg does not use his equilibrium strategy, the media do not
investigate him and there is nothing that contradicts this fact, voters believe that
this candidate is extreme with probability xj 2 (0;1).7 (ii) If the candidate is o￿
his equilibrium path and the media do not investigate him but there is evidence
that contradicts this fact, voters trust the media regarding the new information
(assumption TM). (iii) Likewise, voters trust the media whenever the candidates
use their equilibrium strategy, the media do not investigate but the evidence is
against this fact (assumption TM). (iv) Finally, voters trust the media when one
of the candidates deviates and the media investigate him (assumption TM).
Note that o￿ the equilibrium path, we assume that the voters trust the me-
dia more than the candidates. To see the reason for this assumption, note that
the model reads that politicians can send any message but the media cannot ma-
nipulate news, i.e., they cannot create unveri￿able information.8 Or to say it
di￿erently, if the media investigate (this is the only case in which the media may
say something di￿erent to that written in a platform), the information published
is true.
We are now in position to obtain the ￿rst result of the model.
Proposition 1. There is no equilibrium in which at least one candidate separates,
either truthfully or untruthfully.
The proof of the result is as follows. In any situation in which at least one
candidate separates, Bayes’ rule dictates the voters to believe that the candidate
that separates is moderate when he sends the message that the true moderate
sends in equilibrium. Hence, the extreme type that separates has an incentive to
deviate and mimic the platform sent by the moderate, as in this case voters will
recognize him as a truthful moderate and will vote for him. This rules out the
possibility of separating equilibria in the model. Or to say it di￿erently, in this
model, media do not induce politicians to make informative speeches. In the rest
of the paper we therefore analyze pooling equilibria.
3.1 Monopoly media market
We consider the case of a sole outlet in the ideological media market, which, without
loss of generality, we assume that prefers party R. We ￿rst analyze the behavior of
the medium in this case, and then characterize the equilibria of the entire game.
Proposition 2. Let R be the sole outlet in the ideological media market. Then
ªR(l;¢) = I never occurs, either in equilibrium or o￿ the equilibrium path.
7The working paper version of this paper, Andina-D￿az (2004), considers xj 2 [0;1]. In this
version, however, we use xj 2 (0;1); which allows us to simplify the analysis without major
consequences to our qualitative results.
8Anderson and McLaren (2005), Besley and Prat (2006), Chan and Suen (2006) and Corneo
(2006), among others, present models in which the media can withhold information relevant to
voters.





= (°L(L j pL;mL
R);°R(R j pR;mR
R)) the belief that
the voters have on candidate L being L; given his platform pL and the medium
R’s message on him, mL
R; and the voters’ belief on candidate R being R; given his
platform pR and the medium R’s message on him mR
R.9
To prove the result, let us consider a (pooling) hypothetical equilibrium in
which ¨¤
L(L) = ¨¤
L(M) = pL; ¨¤
R(R) = ¨¤
R(M) = pR; where pL;pL 2 fl;mg,
pR;pR 2 fm;rg, pL 6= pL, pR 6= pR:
After observing message l; the belief of media outlet R on candidate L is ¹L(L j
l) 2 fq;xLg; for pL 2 fl;mg respectively. Suppose ªR(l;pR) = I: Then, voters’
beliefs are either °ll
pRpR = (1;q); °lm
pRpR = (0;q) if pL = l; or °ll
pRpR = (1(TM);q);
°lm
pRpR = (0(TM);q) if pL = m; where the superscript (TM) means that assumption
TM applies. Suppose now ªR(l;pR) = I: Then, voters’ beliefs are either °ll
pRpR =
(1;xR); °lm
pRpR = (0;xR) if pL = l; or °ll
pRpR = (1(TM);xR), °lm
pRpR = (0(TM);xR) if
pL = m:
In all the cases, the payo￿ of the outlet if it investigates is ¹L(L j pL)¤ ¡ K,
and its payo￿ if it does not is ¤: Hence, neither ªR(l;pR) = I nor ªR(l;pR) = I
can occur in equilibrium.
This result says that, in equilibrium, the monopoly never investigates its non-
preferred candidate when he proposes the extreme platform. This implies that
a moderate left-wing candidate cannot take advantage of the media, meaning he
cannot signal his (moderate) type by deviating.
Regarding the equilibria of the entire game, Lemma 1 in the Appendix presents
the characterization of these equilibria. The important result we derive from
Lemma 1 is that the existence of a sole outlet in the ideological media market
introduces a bias in the political game. The next proposition de￿nes this bias. To
prove this result, we focus on the equilibria in which the left-wing candidate is
investigated in equilibrium (cases (i.1) and (i.2) in Lemma 1). We do not analyze
the other equilibria because if the monopoly does not investigate in equilibrium,
either candidate obtains (in expected terms) one half of the votes, so there is no
bias. However, if the outlet does investigate, the left-wing candidate obtains (in
expected terms) (1 ¡ q)n of the votes in equilibrium. Or to say it di￿erently, L
wins the election if q < 1
2 and R does if q > 1
2. Here, there is room for bias.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the parameters q;K and ¤ are uniformly and in-
dependently distributed. Let R be the sole outlet in the ideological media market.
Then, the sets of parameters values sustaining the equilibria in which party R wins,
have higher measure than the sets of parameters values sustaining the equilibria in
which party L does.
Proof. Let us denote p;p 2 fm;rg, p 6= p. We focus on the equilibria in which the
monopoly investigates.
9In the case of a right-wing monopoly, m
R
R = pR always.
6Consider the equilibrium (mm;pp); ªR(m;p) = I; ªR(m;p) = I; ªR(l;p) =
NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; xL > q: The set of parameters values sustaining this equilib-
rium is fK : 0 < K · q¤g: The measure of the set sustaining the equilibrium in
which party L wins is
R 1
2
0 q¤dq = ¤
8: Similarly, the measure of the set sustaining





8 . Since 3¤
8 > ¤
8; party R wins the
election with a higher probability.
Let us consider the equilibrium (mm;pp); ªR(m;p) = I; ªR(m;p) = NI;
ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; xL > q; q = xR ¸ 1
2: The set of parameters values
that sustain this equilibrium is
©
K : q¤
2 · K · q¤
ª
: Note that for this equilibrium
to exist, q ¸ 1
2 must hold. It implies that party L cannot win in this case (for it
to occur, q < 1
2 must hold). Additionally, the measure of the set sustaining the






16: There is therefore a bias in
favor of party R.
Finally, let us consider the equilibrium (mm;rr); ªR(m;r) = I; ªR(m;m) =
NI; ªR(l;r) = NI; ªR(l;m) = NI; xL > q; q < xR: The set of parameters values
that sustain this equilibrium is fK : 0 < K = q¤g; which has zero measure. Then,
there is no bias in this case.
Proposition 3 shows that the sets of parameters values sustaining the equilibria
in which the party with the support of the media wins, have higher measure than
those sets sustaining the equilibria in which the other party wins. This means that
the party supported by the monopoly wins the election with a higher probability
than the other party. Hence the bias.
3.2 Duopoly media market
We now consider the case of two ideological outlets in the media market. Let L
be the media outlet preferring the left-wing party and R be the one preferring the
right-wing party.
As in the previous case, we obtain that ideological outlets never investigate its
non-preferred candidate when he proposes the extreme platform. This result is
formalized in the next proposition.
Proposition 4. Let media outlet L support party L, and let media outlet R support
party R. Then neither ªL(¢;r) = I nor ªR(l;¢) = I occurs, either in equilibrium
or o￿ the equilibrium path.





= (°L(L j pL;mL
R);°R(R j pR;mR
L)); the belief that
voters have on candidate L being L; given his platform pL; and the medium R’s
message on him, mL
R; and the voters’ belief on candidate R being R; given his
platform pR; and the medium L’s message on him mR
L.





R(M) = pR; where pL;pL 2 fl;mg, pR;pR 2 fm;rg, pL 6= pL,
pR 6= pR:
7After observing message l; the belief of medium R on candidate L is ¹L(L j
l) 2 fq;xLg; for pL 2 fl;mg respectively. Analogously, after observing message r;
the belief of medium L on candidate R is ¹R(R j r) 2 fq;xRg; for pR 2 fr;mg
respectively.
Let j 2 fL;Rg; E 2 fL;Rg and e 2 fl;rg, for the left and the right-wing party
respectively.
Suppose ªL(l;r) = I and ªR(l;r) = I: Voters’ beliefs on candidate j are
°j(E j e;e) 2 f1;1(TM)g; for pj 2 fe;mg respectively, where the superscript (TM)
means that assumption TM applies; and they are °j(E j e;m) 2 f0;0(TM)g; for
pj 2 fe;mg respectively. The payo￿ of outlet L if it investigates is ¹L(L j pL)¹R(R j
pR)¤
2 +(1¡¹L(L j pL))¹R(R j pR)¤+(1 ¡¹L(L j pL))(1 ¡¹R(R j pR))¤
2 ¡K, and
its payo￿ if it does not is ¹L(L j pL)¤
2 + (1 ¡ ¹L(L j pL))¤: Then, if ªR(l;r) = I;
ªL(l;r) = I cannot be in equilibrium. Suppose now ªL(l;r) = I and ªR(l;r) =
NI: Voters’ beliefs on candidate L are °L(L j l;l) 2 fq;xLg; for pL 2 fl;mg;
and they are °L(L j l;m) 2 f0(TM);0(TM)g; for pL 2 fl;mg respectively. Voters’
beliefs on candidate R are °R(R j r;r) 2 f1;1(TM)g; for pR 2 fr;mg; and they are
°R(R j r;m) 2 f0;0(TM)g; for pR 2 fr;mg respectively. The payo￿ of outlet L if it
investigates is ¹R(R j pR)¤¡K, and its payo￿ if it does not is ¤: Then, if ªR(l;r) =
NI; ªL(l;r) = I cannot be in equilibrium. Summarizing, ªL(l;r) = I cannot be
in equilibrium. Analogously, we prove that neither ªL(m;r) = I, ªR(l;r) = I;
nor ªR(l;m) = I; can hold in equilibrium. This completes the proof.
Proposition 4 says that, in equilibrium, media outlets with a political motive
never investigate an extreme platform announcement. The reason is that voters
cannot recognize an outlet that deviates and does not investigate, and so, they
believe that a candidate that sends an extreme platform is an extreme type. Hence,
media outlets do not ￿nd it pro￿table to investigate in this case.
An interesting and important result we obtain in the duopoly case is that there
is no equilibrium in which the candidates pool at the moderate message and the two
media outlets investigate in the equilibrium path. The next proposition formalizes
this result.
Proposition 5. For all tL 2 fL;Mg, tR 2 fM;Rg, there is no equilibrium where
¨L(tL) = ¨R(tR) = m and ªL(m;m) = ªR(m;m) = I hold.
The proof of the result is as follows. Consider that such an equilibrium exists
and let us focus on the behavior of (one of) the extreme type candidate. Since the
two media investigate, this guy obtains q n
2 in equilibrium. Now, let us consider he
deviates. From Proposition 4, we know that, if an equilibrium exists, the candidate
that proposes an extreme platform is not investigated. Then, by deviating, he
gets either qn (if the other candidate is investigated) or n
2 (if his opponent is not
investigated). Hence, the extreme type candidate ￿nds it pro￿table to deviate.
There is therefore no equilibrium in which the candidates pool at the moderate
platform and the two outlets investigate in the equilibrium path.
8Note that from Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 we can conclude that there
is no equilibrium in which the two media outlets investigate in the equilibrium
path. In other words, in the equilibrium path (for the platforms’ pro￿le observed
in equilibrium), either no media outlet or just one media outlet investigates. This
is the same as in the media monopoly case.
Regarding the equilibria of the entire game, we observe that if the two parties
have the support of a media outlet, either party has the same probability of winning
the election.
Proposition 6. Let media outlet R support party R, and let media outlet L support
party L. Then, either party wins the election with the same probability.
The proof is direct. It is based on the fact that if each party has the support of
one medium, and the two parties and the two media outlets are symmetric among
them, then the equilibria must be symmetric.10
Hence, from the comparison of the monopoly (Proposition 3) and the duopoly
(Proposition 6) market structures we observe that, for political competition to be
balance, media industry has to be pluralistic in ideology.
In our context, however, it is also interesting to analyze the voters’ welfare
under the two market structures. Since, in our model, voters want to pick a
moderate candidate, we need to compare the probability that a moderate candidate
is elected under a media monopoly versus a media duopoly. To this aim, note that
from the previous analysis we know that in the two market structures, there is,
at most, one media outlet that investigates in the equilibrium path. We now
obtain the probability that a candidate of a moderate type is picked when either
no medium investigates or one does it.
Let us ￿rst consider that no media outlet investigates in the equilibrium path.
We obtain that, in a pooling equilibria, the probability that the elected candidate
is moderate is (1 ¡ q)2 + q(1 ¡ q). In contrast, if one media outlet investigates
in the equilibrium path, the probability that the elected candidate is moderate is
(1 ¡ q) + q(1 ¡ q). Since q > 0, the probability that the voters pick a moderate
candidate is higher under a media market (even in the case of a biased monopoly)
than under no market for news. The next proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 7. The probability that the elected candidate is moderate is higher
when a media industry exists than when it does not. Additionally, this probability
is the same with one than with two media outlets.
Note that this result is partially driven by the assumption that the media
cannot hide a veri￿able outcome, which tends to make politically biased media
comparatively benign. In contrast, if we were to assume that media can manipulate
news, our intuition is that, in equilibrium, media outlets would pool at the extreme
messages and voters would disregard this information. Hence, the existence of a
10The working paper version of this paper, Andina-D￿az (2004), presents the complete charac-
terization of all the pooling equilibria that exist in the duopoly case.
9mass media industry would add nothing to the political game in that case. As a
result, the innocuous role of ideology should be carefully understood in the context
of our model.
4 Conclusion
This model analyzes the role of an ideological media market in a context of asym-
metric information between parties and voters. Voters want to ￿nd out the targets
of parties, as they realize that, once in o￿ce, politicians will implement their pre-
ferred policy. In this setup, we analyze the incentives of ideological media outlets,
which cannot manipulate news, to acquire costly information. We consider two
market structures: a monopoly media market and a duopoly one. Our results
show that if each party has the support of one medium, either party has the same
probability of winning the election. However, if just one of the parties has the
support of the media, the results might well change, as this party will get into
o￿ce with a higher probability than the other party. Additionally, we show that
voters’ welfare is higher under a market for news than under no such industry, and
that, in equilibrium, having one or two media outlets does not matter for voters’
welfare.
Although we do not consider the case of more than two ideological outlets in the
media market, it is worth discussing the implications of such generalization. If we
consider that all the media that prefer the same party receive the political bene￿t
associated when such party gets into o￿ce, our intuition is that, in equilibrium,
it will never be more than one outlet investigating each party. That is to say, if
a particular candidate is investigated, it has to be the case that only one media
outlet incurs in such cost. For if it were not the case, all the outlets that investigate
would ￿nd it pro￿table to (unilaterally) deviate to not investigate, as they would
save the cost and would get the political bene￿t anyway. Hence, no duplication
of investigation costs will appear in equilibrium. Additionally, the information
available to voters will not vary, thereby the political equilibria will remain the
same.
5 Appendix
Lemma 1. Monopoly media market. The following are the only (pure strategy)
equilibria of the entire game:
- ¨¤
L(L) = ¨¤
L(M) = m; ¨¤
R(R) = ¨¤
R(M) = p; ªR(m;p) = I; ªR(m;p) = I;
ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; when q < xL and K · q¤ hold.
- ¨¤
L(L) = ¨¤
L(M) = m; ¨¤
R(R) = ¨¤
R(M) = p; ªR(m;p) = I; ªR(m;p) =
NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; when either q < minfxL;xRg and K =
q¤; or 1
2 · q = xR < xL and q ¤
2 · K · q¤ hold:
10- ¨¤
L(L) = ¨¤
L(M) = m; ¨¤
R(R) = ¨¤
R(M) = p; ªR(m;p) = NI; ªR(m;p) =
I; ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; when q · minf1
2;xLg and q ¤




L(M) = m; ¨¤
R(R) = ¨¤
R(M) = p; ªR(m;p) = NI; ªR(m;p) =
NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; when either q = xR · xL and K ¸ q ¤
2;
or q < xR; q · xL and K ¸ q¤ hold:
- ¨¤
L(L) = ¨¤
L(M) = l; ¨¤
R(R) = ¨¤
R(M) = p; ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) = NI;
ªR(m;p) = NI; ªR(m;p) = I; when either K · xL¤; q < xL and q · xR;
or xL
¤
2 · K · xL¤ and q = xL · xR hold.
- ¨¤
L(L) = ¨¤
L(M) = l; ¨¤
R(R) = ¨¤
R(M) = p; ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) = NI;
ªR(m;p) = NI; ªR(m;p) = NI; when either q · xR < xL; K ¸ xL¤ and
q · xL < xR; or K ¸ xL
¤
2 and q · xL = xR hold.
Proof. Our way of proceeding is: First, we analyze media’s behavior; Second, we
analyze candidates’ behavior. Note that from Proposition 2, ªR(l;¢) = I, never
occurs, either in equilibrium or o￿ the equilibrium path.





R(M) = p; with p;p 2 fm;rg; p 6= p:
Media’s behavior. Case (1) : ªR(l;p) = NI. Voters’ belief are °ll
pp = (xL;q) and
°lm
pp = (0(TM);q): The payo￿ of the outlet is either ¤ if xL > q; ¤
2 if xL = q; or 0 if
xL < q; whereas if it deviates and investigates, its payo￿ is either xL¤¡K if xL > q;
xL
¤
2¡K if xL = q; or ¡K if xL < q: Hence, ªR(l;p) = NI is possible in equilibrium.
Case (2) : ªR(l;p) = NI. Voters’ beliefs are °ll
pp = (xL;xR) and °lm
pp = (0(TM);xR).
The payo￿ of the outlet is either ¤ if xL > xR; ¤
2 if xL = xR, or 0 if xL < xR; whereas
if it deviates and investigates, its payo￿ is always smaller. Thus, ªR(l;p) = NI is
possible in equilibrium. Case (3) : ªR(m;p) = I: Voters’ beliefs are °mm
pp = (0;q)
and °ml
pp = (1;q). The payo￿ of the outlet is q¤ ¡ K; whereas if it deviates and
does not investigate, it is 0: Thus, ªR(m;p) = I implies q¤ ¸ K: Case (4) :
ªR(m;p) = NI: Voters’ beliefs are °mm
pp = (q;q) and °ml
pp = (1(TM);q). The
outlet’s payo￿ is ¤
2; whereas if it deviates and investigates, it is q¤+(1¡q)¤
2 ¡K:
Thus ªR(m;p) = NI implies K ¸ q ¤
2: Case (5) : ªR(m;p) = I: Voters’ beliefs
are °mm
pp = (0;xR) and °ml
pp = (1;xR). Proceeding as previously, we obtain that
ªR(m;p) = I implies q¤ ¸ K. Case (6) : ªR(m;p) = NI: Voters’ beliefs are
°mm
pp = (q;xR) and °ml
pp = (1(TM);xR): Here, ªR(m;p) = NI implies either q > xR;
K ¸ q ¤
2 and xR = q; or K ¸ q¤ and q < xR:
Candidates’ behavior. Case (i:1) : Let us consider the strategy pro￿le (SP,
from now on) (mm;pp); ªR(m;p) = I; ªR(m;p) = I; ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) =
NI; where conditions in (3) and (5) must be satis￿ed. Here, candidate L type
L gains zero in equilibrium, whereas if he deviates and sends the message l; he
gains either n if xL < q; n
2 if xL = q; or 0 if xL > q: Thus, for candidate L type
L being in equilibrium we need q < xL: We also observe that candidate L type
11M has not a pro￿table deviation. Finally, both types of candidate R gain qn in
equilibrium, whereas if they deviate they gain qn: Thus, candidate R does not ￿nd
it strictly pro￿table to deviate. This SP conforms therefore an equilibrium when
parameters and beliefs satisfy q < xL and K · q¤. Case (i:2) : Let us consider
the SP (mm;pp); ªR(m;p) = I; ªR(m;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) = NI;
where conditions in (3) and (6) must be satis￿ed. Candidate L does not deviate
if q < xL; whereas candidate R neither deviates if either q < xR or xR = q ¸ 1
2:
Then, this SP conforms an equilibrium when parameters and beliefs satisfy either
q < minfxL;xRg and K = q¤; or 1
2 · q = xR < xL and q¤
2 · K · q¤: Case (i:3) :
We now consider the SP (mm;pp); ªR(m;p) = NI; ªR(m;p) = I; ªR(l;p) = NI;
ªR(l;p) = NI; where conditions in (4) and (5) must be satis￿ed. Here, either
type of candidate L gains n
2 in equilibrium, whereas if one of them deviates, he
gains either n if xL < q; n
2 if xL = q; or 0 if xL > q: Thus, for L being in
equilibrium we need q · xL: Additionally, either type of candidate R gains n
2,
whereas if one of them deviates, he gains qn: Thus, candidate R does not deviate if
q · 1
2: Then, this SP conforms an equilibrium when parameters and beliefs satisfy
q · minf1
2;xLg and q¤
2 · K · q¤. Case (i:4) : Last, let us consider the SP
(mm;pp); ªR(m;p) = NI; ªR(m;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; where
conditions in (4) and (6) must be satis￿ed: Candidate L does not deviate when
q · xL; and candidate R neither does when q · xR: Then, this SP conforms an
equilibrium when parameters and beliefs satisfy either q = xR · xL and K ¸ q ¤
2;
or q < xR; q · xL and K ¸ q¤:





R(M) = p; with p;p 2 fm;rg; p 6= p:
Media’s behavior. Proceeding as in (i), we obtain that ªR(l;p) = NI and
ªR(l;p) = NI; with p 2 fm;rg; are possible in equilibrium. Case (1) : ªR(m;p) =
I: Voters’ beliefs are °mm
pp = (0(TM);q) and °ml
pp = (1(TM);q). The payo￿ of the
outlet is xL¤¡K; whereas if it deviates its payo￿ is 0: Thus, ªR(m;p) = I implies
xL¤ ¸ K: Case (2) : ªR(m;p) = NI: Voters’ beliefs are °mm
pp = (xL;q) and
°ml
pp = (1(TM);q). The payo￿ of the outlet is either ¤ if xL > q; ¤
2 if xL = q; or 0 if
xL < q; whereas if it deviates its payo￿ is either ¤¡K if xL > q; xL¤+(1¡xL)¤
2 ¡K
if xL = q; or xL¤ ¡ K if xL < q. Thus ªR(m;p) = NI implies either xL > q;
K ¸ ¤
2xL and xL = q; or K ¸ xL¤ and xL < q: Case (3) : ªR(m;p) = I: Voters’
beliefs are °mm
pp = (0(TM);xR) and °ml
pp = (1(TM);xR). Hence, ªR(m;p) = I
implies xL¤ ¸ K: Case (4) : ªR(m;p) = NI: Voters’ beliefs are °mm
pp = (xL;xR)
and °ml
pp = (1(TM);xR). Then, ªR(m;p) = NI implies either xL > xR; K ¸ xL
¤
2
and xR = xL; or K ¸ xL¤ and xL < xR:
Candidates’ behavior. Case (ii:1) : Let us consider the SP (ll;pp); ªR(l;p) =
NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(m;p) = I; ªR(m;p) = I; where conditions in (1) and
(3) must be satis￿ed: Candidate L type M gains n
2 in equilibrium, whereas if he
deviates and sends the message m he gains n: Therefore, this SP cannot constitute
an equilibrium. Case (ii:2) : The same argument proves that the SP (ll;pp);
ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(m;p) = I; ªR(m;p) = NI neither constitutes
12an equilibrium. Case (ii:3) : We now consider the SP (ll;pp); ªR(l;p) = NI;
ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(m;p) = NI; ªR(m;p) = I; where conditions in (2) and (3)
must hold. Candidate L gains n
2 in equilibrium, whereas if he deviates he gains
either n if xL < q; n
2 if xL = q; or 0 if xL > q: Thus, for L being in equilibrium we
need q · xL: Analogously, for R being in equilibrium we need q · xR: Then, this
SP conforms an equilibrium when parameters and beliefs satisfy either K · xL¤;
q < xL and q · xR; or xL
¤
2 · K · xL¤ and q = xL · xR: Case (ii:4) : Finally,
let us consider the SP (ll;pp); ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(l;p) = NI; ªR(m;p) = NI;
ªR(m;p) = NI; where conditions in (2) and (4) must be satis￿ed. Both candidates
do not want to deviate if q · minfxL;xRg: Thus, this SP conforms an equilibrium
when parameters and beliefs satisfy either q · xR < xL; K ¸ xL¤ and q · xL < xR;
or K ¸ xL
¤
2 and q · xL = xR:
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